In the first of this two-part series examining Colin Bloom’s “independent review into how government engages with faith”, we saw how Bloom is tied to organisations marked by anti-Islam fingerprints that lead to the darkest corners of the global Islamophobia industry.
We also witnessed the most blatant manifestation of this group’s agenda to single out and exert control over Islam without affecting Christianity in the form of authoritarian madrassa proposals.
In this part, we will explore how Bloom’s differential treatment of Islam and Muslims becomes apparent in his concepts of “faith sensitivity” and “faith literacy”. We will examine how these terms and the proposals related to them serve as a continuation of the neoconservative assault on Islam and Muslims.
Additionally, we will raise concerns regarding the report’s emphasis on “Sikh extremism” while neglecting to address Hindutva fascism, neoconservative hate, and “Christianist extremism”.
Faith Sensitivity?
The review highlights how the government needs to be “faith sensitive” in its engagement. At one point, it even states that if public bodies are not faith sensitive, there is a “risk” of the government “causing offence” and “designing policies which exacerbate perceptions of not understanding faith communities” (Bloom Review, p.52). It problematises the “purely secular worldview” pushed in schools by arguing that “people feel less welcome to share their views” (p.61).
No faith sensitivity for Muslims
Perhaps Bloom has been living under a rock over the past decade.
As academic literature now shows, the secular liberal inquisition that was the 2014 Trojan Horse fiasco already fulfilled the risks Bloom hypothesises. Muslim children have borne the brunt of the measures applied through the Prevent Duty. Yet, there is no mention of how Muslim children suffered or how Muslim expression was radically curtailed. Is it because the agenda was instantiated by Gove, evangelical Christians such as Tim Boyes were involved, and the target was Islam and Muslims?
Also absent is the mention of the Batley protests, where Muslim parents protested the Islamophobic and racist depiction of the Prophet ﷺ by a non-Muslim teacher.
This case would have exemplified how the behaviour of a public employee was not “faith sensitive”, manifesting the risk of “causing offence” (in fact, the teacher’s conduct failed to meet teaching standards). Instead, at the time, the neocons and their cheerleaders quickly framed the whole episode as a Clash of Civilisations where Muslims were assaulting the selective principle of free speech. More recently, the “independent” Shawcross Review of Prevent followed suit, declaring the response from Muslims an attack on free speech and British values.
These are the same British Values that Bloom trumpets in his report as “foundational” when attempting to sketch a definition of “extremism” (p.26, p.13).
“Hateful extremism”
Bloom acknowledges that “there is no legal definition for extremism”, and so “identifying when a political ideology becomes unacceptable extremist activity is a complex issue” (p.112).
The discussion should come to a close at this point. Attempting to label groups as extremists without an objective definition of “extremism” is a futile endeavour that opens the door to political exploitation, demonisation, and stigmatisation of communities.
Ambiguity
Bloom presents his incoherent opinion of what “extremism” is anyway. Thus, whilst acknowledging that even “seditious” activities are perfectly legal on the one hand, he characterises behaviour that “subverts the democratic order” as “harmful extremism” (p.112). Bloom tries to deal with the fuzziness by providing examples of “denying pluralism” or “shutting down debate”.
However, like most definitions of extremism, Bloom’s attempt is problematic.
It is self-contradictory in that it shuts down behaviour that supposedly shuts down debate. Moreover, it appears to suppress philosophical differences. Pluralism is one political philosophy among others – would favouring other political philosophies constitute “denying pluralism”? And would Bloom’s definition amount to shutting down debate if it did? Ironically, one of the criticisms of pluralism is that it leads to relativism – something Gove has railed against repeatedly. Gove must be a nascent harmful extremist.
Bloom’s nebulous definition can easily entangle his circle too.
Christians, including Bloom’s buddies at the CCP, campaigned to maintain marriage between a man and woman. Should their stance be deemed harmful extremism, denying the value of pluralism? Conversely, does secularists’ repressive treatment of Christians for advocating their traditional view of marriage in public and political arenas constitute harmful extremism?
After all, both views see the other as heretical (i.e., “extremist”) in their social order.
Outcast?
Similar problems plague Bloom’s second interrelated component of “harmful extremism”. He explains that expressions that outcast others as “‘apostates’, ‘unbelievers’ or ‘heretics’” (p.112) would constitute harmful extremism”.
This element of extremism is also self-undermining, as it casts out those the government deems “extremist.” Furthermore, we know this exclusion can happen on spurious grounds. Muslims that do not comply with the neocon government’s interpretation of British Values are branded “Islamists” and “extremists”. The whole purpose of PREVENT and counter-extremism is to anathematise people if they do not fit the government-defined “norm”.
Perhaps Bloom had Muslims in mind when proposing this aspect of “extremism” since we are fair game. But the collateral impact on Bloom’s religion is unavoidable.
Based on their theology, some Christians view Islam as evil and Muslims as satanists.
In 2014, Northern Ireland’s first minister Peter Robinson defended pastor James McConnell who said: “Islam is heathen, Islam is satanic, Islam is a doctrine spawned in hell.” He further said that he did not trust Muslims who followed the Sharīʿa. Is this harmful extremism? Were attempts to have McConnell imprisoned a denial of pluralism? Would these attempts be harmful extremism?
A year later, Reverend Gavin Ashenden, the late Queen’s chaplain no less, implied that the Qurʾān was evil. Is this an example of harmful extremism?
Anglicans have long opposed the Church of Scientology. In 2004, a spokesman for the Anglican Diocese of Birmingham said the movement was “as much a religion as a dog is a vegetable” while criticising a council decision to allow Scientologists to use the city’s Centenary Square. Later, Gove – the same Gove supporting the Bloom Review – called the Church of Scientology an “evil cult”. Harmful extremism much?
The are several intrafaith examples.
Since it had satanic rituals, the former Archbishop Rowan Atkinson “outcasted” Freemasons. There are Anglicans who still maintain this view.
In 2017, it was revealed that conservative evangelicals wished to form a rival Anglican structure to the Church of England (CofE) due to Justin Welby’s unorthodox stance on homosexual relationships. A non-CofE Anglican Church, which has already consecrated a Bishop in the UK, declared Welby a heretic. This controversy has been ongoing. More recently, Christian Today reported that the CofE Evangelical Council (CEEC) rejected the leadership of the Archbishop of Canterbury over his support for plans to introduce same-sex blessings.
Late last year, whilst giving a sermon at a church, a researcher at Cambridge claimed Jesus may have been transgender. Worshippers were left in tears as they cried “heresy”.
Then there are some interesting statements made by conservative commentator, deacon, and student of Islamophobe Michael Nazir-Ali, Calvin Robinson. Robinson has been a mouthpiece for the hate-financed Henry Jackson Society on race issues and is a senior fellow at Policy Exchange. Earlier this year, Robinson blasted Christian clergy who support the extension of sacraments to same-sex marriages in the following words:
“We are seeing the most rapid decline of Christianity in this country that we may have ever seen. Do not accelerate it with heresy. You do not have the authority to bless sin. When I hear the bishop of London on record saying these new prayers will mean priests can bless same-sex relationships, some of which may be sexual in nature, I hear the devil at work. Bishops are promoting the idea of sacramental sodomy. Let them be anathema.”
Are all these examples of rejecting and “outcasting” others and cries of heresy and anathema harmful extremism?
It is difficult to see how Bloom can push this definition of extremism without it impacting Christianity.
Groupings of all kinds will regulate their boundaries. Bloom inadvertently acknowledges this in the review when he differentiates “mainstream Christianity and Judaism” from Black Hebrew Israelites (p.119).
The rule of law is the only principle that can fairly govern the interests and activities of competing groups. Since Bloom has already acknowledged that there is no legal definition of “extremism”, for a state to deny religions the ability to define and maintain their boundaries is the very definition of government interference in religion.
“Intrafaith Matters” or Divide and Conquer?
The problems of the “outcast” definition of extremism bleed into the report’s framing of intrafaith as “extremist”.
The report recommends that “intrafaith matters” be regulated through “faith literacy” training so that public sector workers are “aware of tensions and differences between sects” (p.88) and can understand the root causes of tensions and hate (p.22).
The way in which the report discusses intrafaith concerns is sporadic and feels tacked on. Is it because this recommendation has been lifted from a Policy Exchange (PX) report that posits a similar colonialist-style divide-and-conquer politics to justify greater regulation of Islam?
PX’s report, Delegitimising Counter-Terrorism, calls for establishing a government propaganda unit dedicated to whitewashing and spinning PREVENT and its harms.
Germanely, the function of this unit is to monitor Muslim disputes:
“It will also need to monitor and document Islamist and other extremist narratives, conspiracy theories, and contentious intra-Islamic disputes regarding sectarianism and blasphemy.”
This discriminatory function feeds into a further PX recommendation that no government institutions should fund organisations that “promote religious sectarianism” (p.85).
In other words, the government will decide what “religious sectarianism” is and who needs to be ostracised. This is dangerous.
Last year, “The Lady of Heaven” movie caused significant controversy among Muslims due to its propagation of a sectarian, mythological narrative that attacks the revered figures in the Sunni tradition. In response, Muslims protested the movie.
Officials were not “faith sensitive” to Sunni Muslims here. They were partisan to the side that caused “offence”. Michael Gove’s department sacked Qari Asim as a government advisor for supporting the protestors. Moreover, the movie producer, linked to a violence-supporting fringe Shia cleric, was supported by a coterie of pro-Israeli neoconservative individuals and organisations, including PX.
Given the PX report, the government’s reaction to the Lady of Heaven movie, and Bloom’s silence on Christian intrafaith concerns highlighted above, Bloom’s recommendation continues the neocon agenda to regulate and exploit Muslim communities.
“Faith Literacy”: Religion-focused PREVENT
The practical impact of Bloom’s vague definition of “extremism” is that PREVENT theory and assumptions are imported into the report in all but name.
Bloom explains that it is not the “role of government to tell people what to believe or to offer any opinion on what is right or wrong when it comes to religious observance” (p.62). As part of his “faith literacy”, Bloom recommends a Faith Champion’s Office to oversee the training of civil servants on religions so that they can “recognise and understand the diverse religious life of the population” (p.19).
However, the report itself urges the government to not only tell people what to believe in but also to perpetuate the “good Muslim”/ “bad Muslim binary that has stigmatised Muslims since the inception of the War on Terror.
Islamism
Thus, while noting that defining the term is challenging, Bloom adopts and uses “Islamism” throughout the report (p.114). It is unclear how anyone can go after something that is not defined. However, in terms of application, its vagueness, and Bloom’s co-option of recommendations concerning Islamism from broader government reports, the Bloom report continues to use Islamism as a bucket for any beliefs and practices that the government of days does not like.
And so, despite the lack of an objective definition, Bloom prescribes measures to tackle Islamism. In fact, he proposes that the distinction between Islam and Islamism, i.e., the good Muslim and bad Muslim, should be “robustly” reinforced by the government through his suggested faith literacy training. Bloom even suggests that this training will solve Islamophobia! (pp.114-115)
This a classic sheep in wolf’s clothing recommendation. It appears to resolve issues of Islamophobia but entrenches an approach that has only perpetuated anti-Muslim discrimination, not even sparing Muslim politicians, as evidenced in Bloom’s own report (p.114).
The distinction tactic is old. “Care” was taken to distinguish Islam from Islamism in David Cameron’s 2011 Munich Speech here and his 2015 Birmingham Speech here. In 2016, Gove even sought to differentiate the “great religion of Islam” from Islamism, as noted by Montgomerie. This tactic has been consistently used to drive the neocon precrime view of counter-terrorism for years.
Bloom simply reinforces these old neocon tropes.
Prisoner radicalisation
The report’s discussion on prisoner radicalisation, titled “Faith literacy and deradicalisation”, further demonstrates Bloom’s disguised PREVENT strategy.
The section focuses on “Islamist extremism”, arguing that to inhibit the spread of “religious extremism in prisons”, the “complex issues of religious radicalisation, faith-based gangs and forced conversions” need to be understood as religious affairs issues (p.94). Thus,
“Equipping staff and officials with an understanding of theological and religious belief will help them identify radicalised religious ideas or ideologies and help prisoners in their rehabilitation.”
This recommendation flatly contradicts academic research into this area. Several points place Bloom’s focus on “religious affairs” in the context of prisoner radicalisation into question.
Firstly, the notion that ideology, rather than other factors such as foreign policy, drives radicalisation is academically unsupported. Secondly, “faith-based gangs” implies Islam drives gang violence in prisons. This focus on religion or religious ideology is dubious, given how research shows that gang violence and intimidation often determine a prisoner’s move into whichever community system provides sanctuary. In other words, conversions tend to reflect temporary opportunistic alliances.
Thirdly, aside from anecdotal hearsay claims, there is little evidence presented to prove systematic attempts by Muslims to convert prisoners forcibly. On the contrary, research suggests charismatic leaders present themselves as trustworthy guides, “propagating Islam as a means to find identity and meaning in life.” This research also highlights that the aim of the recruiters in the study “was conversion to Islam, not radicalization.”[1]
Fourthly, even if forced conversions occur, due to the first two points, there is no evidence to prove that religion is the cause. Indeed, the act of forcing someone to convert to Islam flatly contradicts the clear text of the Qurʾān (2:256). Finally, there is no academic support or empirical evidence that proves those who engage in faith-based gang violence or conversions are radicalisation concerns, i.e., that such behaviour leads to political violence.
Instead of evidence and reason, Bloom’s discourse and the proposed policies are rooted in a fear-based approach that treats Muslims discriminatorily.[2]
Ian Acheson
Ian Acheson’s discriminatory 2016 review of “Islamist extremism” in prisons is emblematic of this fear-based approach. Indeed, the fact that Bloom approvingly cites Acheson’s report to formulate his recommendations is revealing.
Acheson is a proponent of precrime intervention, PREVENT, and CVE and has even endorsed the widely boycotted and heavily criticised Shawcross Review of Prevent.
Acheson also seems to have a cosy relationship with virulent neocon Islamophobes. He has called anti-Islam hate preacher Douglas Murray “peerless” and promoted a satirical review that endorses Murray’s book. The review is published in UnHerd, a conservative website founded by CCF’s Montgomerie. Michael Gove is another anti-Muslim neocon Acheson appears to have a particular affection for. Acheson has said that Gove has a “unique combination of intellect and will to transform prisons” and that “No-one in politics has better ideas or greater will to fix broken prison system than Michael Gove”. On delivering Brexit, for Acheson, “If anyone can do it, it’s Gove.” Unsurprisingly, Acheson is linked to the hate-financed HJS. He has publicly supported past HJS reports on terrorism and prisoners and has appeared on HJS panel discussions.
Acheson reflects this neocon milieu’s support for the apartheid state of Israel. In recent years, the Zionist entity has repeatedly stormed Masjid Al-Aqsa. In Ramadan 2021, following violence perpetrated by the Zionist regime against worshippers at Al-Aqsa, Keir Starmer issued a response calling on Israel to observe international law. Disturbingly, instead of acknowledging and condemning the horrific violence, Acheson appeared to provide cover to collective punishment by quote-tweeting Starmer’s response with a sarcastic comment that diverted attention to Hamas and rocket fire.
The prelude to the Acheson report was notable for a stream of media reports that painted chaplain imams of traditional Islamic persuasion as “extremists”. Literature reflecting traditional Islamic jurisprudential rulings was also framed as “Islamist” and “extremist”. Bloom’s report regurgitates this narrative by highlighting how prison imams “linked to radicalism” had slipped through the cracks. Following the Acheson review, Bloom recommends tighter vetting for chaplains (i.e., imams) and control of “extremist literature”.
The full Acheson report is not publicly available for scrutiny, so its definitions, claims, and evidence cannot be examined. We can see the importance of scrutiny by taking the Bloom Report as an example. The report adduces the independent terrorism reviewer Jonathan Hall’s report on prisoner radicalisation and quotes the government’s response, which acknowledges the need to develop a more rigorous approach to terrorism risk behaviour. This call is unchallenged, even though Hall includes behaviours such as listening to “violent nasheeds” (rap music, anyone?), unofficial prayer gatherings, and joking during Remembrance Day as terrorist risk behaviours. Instead, Bloom emphasises the “theological drivers of radicalisation” to improve the identification of terrorism risk behaviours (p.96).
What little is available of the Acheson review has been the subject of academic critique. Professor Andrew Silke mentions that the recommendations from the Acheson review raised concerns among researchers and were not adopted by the National Offender Management Service. Providing the empirical view of the state of radicalisation in prisons, Prof. Silke comments:[3]
“It is perhaps not surprising that such conclusions were not shared by NOMS which could highlight the very low re-offending rate for former terrorist prisoners, and the extreme rarity of cases of individuals actually radicalized in prison in England and Wales who are subsequently convicted of terrorist offences. In some respects the Acheson conclusions were more about the perceived potential for radicalization rather than actual radicalization.”
In other words, Acheson’s conclusions were not based on “actual radicalization”.
With unsubstantiated neocon assumptions embedding proposals that perpetuate the demonisation of the Muslim minority, it is business as usual with the Bloom Review.
What happened to Christianist Extremism?
What reinforces the bias and lack of credibility is how Bloom deftly avoids discussing Christianity as a religion or religious ideology within the context of extremism.
Therefore, while he frames Islamism as a religious ideology that drives Muslims to terrorism, no Christian equivalent is raised or discussed. This avoidance is apparent in the way language is used and the examples he frames.
Language
Notably, not once does Bloom employ the term “Christian extremism” or “Christianism”.
The reason is apparent when we understand how Islamism tends to be defined. For example, the 2013 PREVENT strategy defined Islamism in the following way:
“‘Islamist’, a word used in a variety of ways to refer to a political philosophy which, in the broadest sense, promotes the application of Islamic principles to governance.” (para. 8.15)
The more recent Shawcross review (link, p.17) similarly considers the belief that Islam should be the basis of “political decision-making” as “Islamist.”
If we were to extend this definition to the Christian faith, it would label the application of Biblical principles and values to political governance as extremist. This framing presents a problem for politicians like Gove and past prime ministers like Tony Blair, who believed God wanted him to go to war, and David Cameron, who thought his Big Society policy was invented by Jesus (upon him be peace).
Likewise, Bloom and his Christians in Politics (CIP) organistion would fall into the nebulous realm of “extremism”.
CIP openly rejects the Church/State split, stating that Christianity is “full of political language”, and the verse “render unto Caesar” is misinterpreted and misused to keep “the realm of God” out of politics.
Other materials encourage political participation in various social spheres that can be seen as “subversive”. One CIP home study guide for Christian “cells” states that its purpose is “to encourage and equip Christians to become more extensively and effectively involved in politics and government as an aspect of mission.” A student politics guide references Bible verses to show that Christians “receive the commission to rule over creation”.
Focussing on the local level, another guide urges Christians to get involved in politics so that they can apply Christian morality and influence decisions since this influence is only possible “inside the system”:
“There are also opportunities to influence decisions such as whether a strip club gets permission to operate, or another establishment is licensed to sell alcohol… [local politics] is a hugely important area for Christians to have an influence and is only accessible to those ‘inside the system’”
In another CIP document, several examples of Christians in Civil Service evangelising Christianity and influencing MPs are presented. For example:
If we apply the counter-extremism discourse concerning Islamism, all this Christian “extremism” could potentially create conditions that enable warmongering, Christianism-inspired neocons like Gove to advocate violence, illegal invasions, and proxy wars. It would therefore necessitate pre-emptive exorcising through “faith literacy” training.
We can imagine the political and media reaction if the word “Christian” was replaced with Muslim” in the above excerpts. Muslims would be treated as a fifth column or “entryists” on the cusp of detonation.
Alternative framing of acts perpetrated by Christians
Bloom further excludes Christianity from counter-extremism measures in the way it portrays instances of Christian violence and intimidation.”
For Bloom, unlike various actions perpetrated by Muslims, Christian actions and behaviours are not “faith-based” or motivated by religious ideology (p.116). Instead, people misuse Christian narratives and images:
“While religious ideology is not necessarily a motivating factor, Christian religious imagery and language can sometimes be attributed to an imagined past (which is de facto white), where the UK was successful and thriving. A belief that the UK is a “Christian country, and we need to keep it like that” can be used to entrench an ethno-nationalist agenda and gain public legitimacy for aggression towards others regarded as a threat to preserving what is perceived to be the national identity.” (Ibid.)
In other words, Christianity is misused as a vehicle for different agendas. Thus, Britain First (BF) “invading” mosques, conducting “Christian patrols”, and handing out Bibles in mosques are actions that are not “necessarily” religiously motivated. This is the case despite BF’s Paul Golding and Jayden Fransen calling themselves “practising Christians”. All this is not a political expression of Christian tenets. It is a case of nationalist agendas abusing Christianity.
Why is this nuance not extended to Muslim political violence, where the repeated emphasis is religious ideology?
The clearly biased stance on Christianity and its place in the discourse of “extremism” and “terrorism” exposes Bloom’s blind spot.
Explicit examples of anti-Islam Christian groups are ignored. For example, Andrew Leak, suspected of petrol-bombing an immigration centre, was of far-right persuasion. Leak also followed anti-Islam Christian groups, such as God Hates Islam and the Traditional Britain Group. The latter organisation has been addressed by neocon hate preacher Douglas Murray’s mentor Roger Scruton.
Also ignored is the transatlantic, neocon-Christian-pro-Israeli alliance (which includes Catholic Deacon Robert Spencer) that has been driving Islamophobia in the West and has influenced far-right killers such as Anders Breivik and Bretton Tarrant.
Bloom conveniently ignores all this hate and violence. To focus on this alliance would implicate him and his nexus of neocon/Christian “extremists”.
Pandering to Hindutva
Bloom’s blind spot is not only limited to Christians. There is considerable focus on “Sikh Extremism”, which exceeds even the section on “Islamist extremism”.
However, what is glaringly notable is that the word “Hindutva” does not even appear in the entire report.
The fascist Hindutva ideology is disrupting Western countries, including the UK, where an entire network of organisations promotes Modi interests, anti-Muslim propaganda and conspiracy theories whilst hosting BJP/RSS hatemongers. Disturbingly, the Hindutva network of ideologues and organisations directly links to pro-Israeli and neoconservative far-right groups in Europe and America. Collectively, they have inspired far-right mass murderers like Anders Breivik.
Aside from Hindutva networks operating in the UK, their charitable operations also push hateful propaganda. In 2015, the UK branch of the fascist Hindutva RSS group was exposed for having a speaker at a camp telling students that Christians seek to “destroy Hindu history” and that Islam is “the worst religion in the world.” Members of the charity at the camp also promoted the Nazi-inspired work and teachings of Hindutva founder M.S. Golwalkar.
(For a detailed view of the Hindutva threat and what is missing from the Bloom review, see here, here, and our detailed report on a UK Hindutva outfit, Vichaar Manthan, here).
More can be mentioned about the Hindutva regime and its tentacles here in the West, but the Bloom Review suffices with a couple of short paragraphs on “Hindu nationalism”.
Concluding Remarks
For those who have been monitoring the actions of neoconservatives over the past decades, Colin Bloom’s report presents more of the same: an endeavour by the state to exert control over Islam and regulate Muslims, encompassing both public expression and private practices within our homes.
The only apparent difference is that Bloom employs a deceitfully softer approach, disguising his targeting of Islam while fervently attempting to evade the regulation of Christianity. However, his strategy, as manifested in his notions of “faith sensitivity” and “faith literacy”, fails to conceal this underlying agenda. From the definition of extremism and the neoconservative assumptions that underpin “Islamism” to the flimsy arguments and exceptional treatment of Christianity, it is the same old boring song and dance.
Despite this routine treatment, as Muslims, we must remain vigilant to the strategies that seek to reassure us but lead us into the same trap that ends with the PREVENT policy. Muslims should dismiss the Bloom Review as a jumbled concoction of recycled neoconservative fantasies authored by a discredited individual.
What is different this year is the focus on Sikh “extremism” and the curious absence of Hindutva from the Bloom Review.
It indicates that Bloom is bending over backwards to please Modi and his sympathisers here in the UK, including the one housed in Number 10.
We feel a duty to address the Sikh community. The fact that the Bloom Review extensively targets you whilst glossing over the insidious global threat of Hindutva fascism is an egregious act that reveals broader agendas at play.
Neoconservative organisations like Policy Exchange and the Henry Jackson Society, in particular, have become mouthpieces of the Hindutva. We urge you to study this partnership, which is unified by common hate-based interests, and the extensive network of Hindutva organisations permeating the UK social and political landscape. The neoconservatives are a small but loud band of hate- and warmongers that have tried to make Islam and Muslims the target of their demonisation and state-level repression.
They have added you to the list.
Their strategy is to smear by association and invoke collective guilt. In other words, they will seek to regulate the Sikh community and activism on the pretext of terrorism and extremism by associating them with freedom struggles framed as terrorism.
We must call out this hate-based neocon-Hindutva alliance and the ideologies, ideologues, organisations, and politicians supporting it.
As a Christian, Mr Bloom should be ashamed of himself. If waxing and spinning for hateful neocons and Hindutva fascists is what “Christianity in Politics” looks like, then it high time Bloom engaged in some “faith-based” reflection.
References
[1] Silke A. (2019). Physical facilitating environments – prisons and madrassas as mechanisms and vehicles of violent radicalisation?’, in Richards, A., Margolin, D. and Nicolo Scremin (2019). Jihadist Terror. London: I. B. Taurus, p.171.
[2] This is characteristic of the discourse on “prisoner radicalisation”. See Veldhuis, T.M. (2016). Prisoner Radicalization and Terrorism Detention Policy. Routledge.
[3] Silke A. (2019). Physical facilitating environments – prisons and madrassas as mechanisms and vehicles of violent radicalisation?’, in Richards, A., Margolin, D. and Nicolo Scremin (2019). Jihadist Terror. London: I. B. Taurus, p.172.
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