A Comment on Mohammed Nizami’s Messages Concerning our Critique

We recently published a seven-part series outlining the ideological component of the UAE-based post-Gaza plan. In the sixth part, we exposed Mohammed Nizami’s deformation of Islam by critiquing his “Abrahamic system of thought” based on a public lecture he delivered at Oxford University. This piece comments on some messages Nizami published recently on his Telegram channel concerning our article. Links to his Telegram messages are here and here.

The original critique of Nizami’s lecture can be found here.

Nizami insists his message is neither a response nor a refutation to us, as he claims he wouldn’t “degrade himself” with such an action. Instead, he presents our article as a “case study” – though it clearly attempts to counter some of our points. In the same spirit, we offer a brief comment on his “not-a-response” response.

To cut to the chase, his message fails to convincingly address any of our substantive critiques.

The only ostensibly noteworthy point Nizami makes pertains to the narration he cited during his talk at Oxford University to explain verse 3:19 (“Indeed, the dīn with Allah is Islam”). We had stated that this narration was absent from the tafsīrs of Ṭabarī and Qurṭubī under verse 3:19. This assertion was based on Nizami’s own talk, wherein he states “Qurṭubī mentions that ḥadīth, so does Ṭabarī and others” before quoting 3:19 in Arabic and providing his interpretation of the verse. In his message, Nizami highlights the ḥadīth is present in Tafsīr al-Qurṭubī, albeit under the preceding verse. However, the wording Nizami uses for the ḥadīth (“The religion with Allah is the Ḥanīfīyyah”) does not appear in Tafsīr al-Ṭabarī. Nevertheless, we appreciate his clarification. Of course, it does nothing to counter the substantive contention:

  1. that the ḥadīth in Tirmidhī mentions the “essence” of religion in the context of the Ḥanīfīyyah to refer to the principles of religion, that there is no problem with this, and his choice to exclude “essence” dovetails his broader aim to downplay the notion of “Islam” as the name of the religion associated with the Prophet ﷺ;
  2. that classical scholars of Qurʾān and Ḥadīth have also understood “Islam” as a noun referring to the religion of Prophet ﷺ.

The rest of Nizami’s message is a mixture of bogus pseudo-psychological explanations focused on our supposed mindset and his now trademark sloppiness and fallacious distortions. The assumptions about us are irrelevant to the points raised in our original article and therefore do not warrant attention. However, we will highlight some of his latest distortions.

After making the aforementioned point, Nizami says we reference “Ibn Ashur” on the “entire passage (3:18-22)”. We quoted Ibn Kathīr, among others. Not Ibn Ashur.

Summarising our purported position he says, “If I’m talking about Abraham and his tradition then I must agree with Christianity/Judaism, and although he fully acknowledges that I’ve said otherwise, he maintains that I must also agree with the Abrahamic Accords between UAE and Israel, with the insinuation that I support Israel.” This formulation is a straw man version of what we present in our article. First, we reference (and acknowledge) his quotes citing statements and verses rejecting and criticising Christianity and Judaism. Second, on UAE, we stated, “The themes emerging from Nizami’s lecture soften the attitude towards a reconstituted identity that focuses on the figure of Abraham (عليه السلام). In this sense, it is a deformist stepping stone towards the UAE’s Abrahamic Family House de-Islamisation project”. We also said, “Others, like Mohammed Nizami, inadvertently or otherwise, are implementing a more covert approach to fulfil broader UAE-Zionist designs.”

He states, “His evidence for my CVE neocon leanings is…wait for it…an innocuous tweet ‘liked’ by Averroes’ social media account about 8 years ago.” Readers can peruse our analysis based on his organisation Averroes, which advanced “solutions in counter-extremism”, its written evidence submitted to the Home Affairs Select Committee’s inquiry into Countering Extremism in Britain, and Nizami’s questionable narratives at that time.

He claims, “In fact, he explicitly refers to himself as a Hindustani.” None of our writers have ever identified themselves as “Hindustani” on this blog. (Also, Nizami’s assumptions about our identity and ideology such as “Hindustani ideology” and “Musalmanism” are irrelevant to the validity of our arguments against his deformist ideas, amounting to a deflection).

Nizami quotes our criticism that “there is a concerted effort to elevate the significance of the patriarchal figure while downplaying the term ‘Islam’ as associated with the Prophet ﷺ and the word ‘Muslim’ as an identity.” In his response, he splits this point into two, misrepresenting our position as having an issue with elevating Prophet Ibrāhīm (عليه السلام). He remarks, “It’s interesting that the tribalist doesn’t like my doing so.” However, as per our article, the problem is Nizami’s double shift, both elevating the patriarchal figure and simultaneously downplaying the terms “Islam” and “Muslim” in relation to the Prophet ﷺ: “The issue lies in Nizami’s persistent minimisation of ‘Islam’ as a religion, ‘Muslim’ as our identity, and the place of the Prophet ﷺ while prioritising Prophet Abraham (عليه السلام).”

Furthermore, Nizami explains that he is “downplaying” the term “Islam” in the context of “British Muslim” and “Musalman identity.” As we have detailed in our article, Nizami’s argument is far more subversive. He dismisses the notion that the terms “Islam” and “Muslims” are names referring to a religion and its followers, a position at odds with other verses and statements of classical scholars.

Nizami attempts to brush aside some of our arguments as mere “Hindustani readings” of exegetes, an equivocal hermeneutical characterisation that he fails to define or evidence. By doing so, he constructs yet another straw man and a false dichotomy, placing our “readings” of exegetical references at odds with the exegetes’ mentions of the Ḥanīfīyyah. However, we have clearly stated, “Islam is understood in at least two ways. The first is a general linguistic sense, referring to submission to Allah, which admits of the Ḥanīfīyyah. The second is as a noun specific to the Prophet ﷺ and his Sharīʿa.” Our argument is that “Nizami trades on this duality to extinguish the second meaning.” The references used in our article contain the corresponding Arabic text. Readers are invited to draw their own conclusions about who is presenting a holistic account, and who is propounding a partial, distorted message, reheating the arguments of deformists.

As we, the brainwashed “Hindustani” simpletons, marvel at Nizami’s dizzying heights of profundity, we cannot help but notice what remains unaddressed. Chiefly:

  1. His questionable reconstruction of the definition of “religion” to argue Islam is not a “religion”.
  2. His misleading claims that
    1. “Al-Suyūṭī mentions that the Ṣaḥāba didn’t have a name” for the Qurʾān and
    1. that the word “Qurʾān” is “just a noun, not a name,” in contrast to the view of Al-Suyūṭī (and al-Shāfiʿī and Imam of qirāʾah Ibn Kathīr), whose book he cites.
  3. His distortion of the ḥadīth concerning verses of the Qurʾān supplanting the previous Revelations (Musnad Aḥmad, 16982).
  4. His diminishing of the status of the Qurʾān as merely a “chapter” in a bigger book comprised of prior revelations, suggesting we “cannot just pick” it exclusively to understand Allah’s message.
  5. His rejection of the use of the terms “Islam” and “Muslim” as names associated with the religion of the Prophet ﷺ in contrast with the explications of classical scholars such as Zamakhsharī, Abū Ḥayyān, Al-Suyūṭī, Al-Baghawī, Ibn ʿAṭiyyah, and Al-Nawawī.
  6. His simplistic and flawed reasoning for rejecting the use of what he calls “foreignized” terms such as Qurʾān, Islam, and Muslim.
  7. His troubling framing of following the Prophet ﷺ – which grants a more complete explanation that entails “millat Ibrāhīm” – as “simplistic”.
  8. His misleading claim that the Prophets “all have the same Sharāʾiʿ (laws), its just amendments”.
  9. The lack of substantiation for his assertion that knowing that this religion is the religion of Abraham changes our perspective of the Sharīʿa and helps us understand Sharīʿa better.
  10. His lack of demonstration that
    1. scholars in the UK are unaware of the meanings of “Islam” and “Muslim”,
    1. that this lack of awareness and the “Abrahamic context” impaired their ability to apply the Sharīʿa and Uṣūl al-Fiqh, and
    1. this has been the cause of Muslim problems.
  11. His misleading assertion that the Prophet ﷺ would not urge Jews and Christians to follow him when speaking to them.

But of course, Nizami’s “not-a-response” response is not meant to be a refutation.

We end with a quote from Nizami that seems to reveal more about his own implied position than the condition of his critics. He highlights our concern that Nizami is effectively suggesting Muslim scholars in the UK have got Islam wrong and he has the solution. He then says:

“Ahhh…So there you have it: Classic Pharisee fragility. It immediately reminded me of the fragile opponents of Noah who said, “He is merely a mortal like you, trying to gain some superiority over you. God would have sent down angels if He had wished; besides, we never heard of anything like this from our forefathers. He is just a madman, so let’s wait and see what happens to him.” (23:24-25)”

Is Nizami comparing himself to the position of the prophet?

P.S. Nizami wishes to use our summary of his position. We have no qualms. Our only condition is that he credits the author by sharing the link to the original article alongside it:

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